I am glad to announce another speaker at our seminars. It is our own Lukas Bielik with his ‘The New Riddle of Induction – Either the Old Problem or No Induction?‘. Abstract below.
My presentation/lecture comes with Goodman´s original formulation of The New Riddle of Induction, including the definition of grue-like predicates. The evidence/confirmation relation between an observation statement and The Grue Emeralds hypothesis is examined. Using several definitions of the key concepts such as empirical property or identity of empirical properties that we use later in our argument, it is claimed that i) Goodman´s characterization of the new riddle is indeed not intelligible within his nominalistic talk of predicates (rather than properties); and, moreover, ii) it is argued that if we interpret Goodman´s position in term of properties, designated by such predicates as „green“ or „grue“, his problem may be redescribed either as a variant of Hume´s original problem of induction, or it is, indeed, not a problem of the induction.